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The urge for revenge after an individual experiences a transgression is ever-present. 
However, little is known about why one chooses revenge specifically versus other 
options. This paper examines the desire for revenge as a function of the need for 
closure. Specifically, this paper argues that due to its evolutionary benefits, revenge is 
the most cognitively accessible reaction and thus, individuals high (vs. low) in the 
need for closure seize and freeze on it after a transgression occurs. Results provide 
convergent support for the positive association between the need for closure and the 
desire for revenge but are unable to provide evidence that revenge serves the urgency
and permanency desires of high need for closure because of its greater saliency. 
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The urge for revenge when one suffers a perceived injustice is ubiquitous. It can 
be traced back through history and is also found among animals (McCullough, 2008). But 
this phenomenon is not well understood. Specifically, there is little research investigating 
why one would desire or seek revenge after a transgression as opposed to pursuing other 
options, such as forgiveness. This paper will provide evidence that revenge is chosen 
through motivated cognition and in particular, that revenge is desired more by some 
individuals than others. This paper will specifically examine the relationship between the 
need for cognitive closure (NFC; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) and the desire for, and 
willingness to engage in, revenge.  
Behaving in a vengeful, or aggressive, manner after a perceived wrong is an 
innate impulse and one that has a strong influence on behavior (Marongui & Newman, 
1987; Stuckless & Goranson, 1992). Most researchers agree that revenge is an act 
committed in response to a prior harmful act by another (Allred, 1999; Stuckless & 
Goranson, 1992). It is a response that is motivated by an injustice and can serve many 
different purposes, including: validation of moral standards (Vidmar, 2002), protecting 
one’s belief in a just world and reinstating moral order in society (Lerner, 1980;
McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick & Johnson, 2001). It can act as a restorative of the 
balance of power (Crombag Rassin, & Horselenberg, 2003; Frijda, 1994) and justice 
(McCullough et al., 2001; Vidmar & Miller, 1980) as well as one’s self-image (Miller, 
2001) and self-esteem (Crombag et al., 2003). It has also been argued that revenge is an 





deter the abuse of power by authorities (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999), and to deter future 
transgressions (Allred, 1999; Crombag et al., 2003).   
These purposes of revenge can be categorized as acts that a) prevent futur  acts of 
aggression and b) help one to regain personal significance that was lost during a 
transgression.  However, both of these central purposes of revenge can be included within 
the same conceptual framework. Specifically,  research (e.g. Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; 
Deci & Ryan, 1995; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Horney, 1937; James, 1890; Kernis, 2003; 
Kernis & Waschull, 1995; Pyszczyski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004; 
Rogers, 1959; Sullivan, 1953; Tesser, 1988) has shown that people have a motivation to 
feel good about themselves, to have high self esteem, and to feel important. When 
someone is treated contrary to this idea by being humiliated or wronged, it makes 
apparent the discrepancy between how one sees oneself and how one is being treated by 
others. This discrepancy may be viewed as a lack of closure. Therefore, after a 
transgression, one may have a goal of achieving closure and this may be seen as 
achievable by taking revenge. Indeed, research has shown that an individual often view 
aggression or revenge after an injustice as a method of catharsis. Consequently, aft r 
engaging in these acts, one expects that the tension will be released and one’s positive 
affect will be restored1 (see Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008). 
From an evolutionary perspective, preventing future acts of aggression against 
oneself was likely instrumental to survival and could also be important for one’s 
fundamental needs for self-value or esteem (Maslow, 1943). In other words, revenge may 
viewed as a way to reestablish one’s sense of worth. A specific example of this need for 
                                                
1 It should be noted that these positive expectations f r aggression and revenge are errors in affectiv 
forecasting and indeed, revenge does not lead to positive cognitive benefits (Carlsmith et al., 2008) or 





self-value resides in the research on the Culture of Honor (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; 1999), 
which shows that in these cultures, men attend to the “code of honor” and thus are 
more ready to fight or kill to defend their reputation. For example, a man from a 
culture of honor is more likely to view insults as directly impacting his masculine 
reputation, or as violations of personal honor (Nisbett & Cohen, 1999), and thus 
sees aggression as a way of restoring his status (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, Schwarz, 
1996). Aggression is a behavior intended to hurt another (Anderson & Bushman, 
2002) and in this case is an example of revenge. 
No matter what the impetus is when a person chooses to engage in revenge, it is 
unclear why an individual would choose revenge specifically, especially when another 
reaction could have achieved the same end result. For example, if one is transgressed 
against in the workplace, preventing future acts of aggression may be achieved by simply 
notifying a superior. Alternatively, one may be able to restore lost personal sig ificance 
by focusing on other important aspects of one’s life (i.e., self affirmation), or by forgiving 
the offender and therefore being able to view oneself as a “good and forgiving person.” I 
argue that an individual chooses revenge as a response to a transgression because revenge 
should be the most cognitively available reaction.  
Specifically, revenge is expected to be a more salient response to a perceived 
injustice than forgiveness because of its evolutionarily-adaptive nature. According to 
McCullough (2008), individuals’ innate willingness to use revenge has adaptive 
advantages and can even be seen in nonhuman animals who use revenge for the same 
reasons as those used by humans. While McCullough acknowledges that several 





human trait because natural selection specifically crafted it for its ability to help humans’ 
ancestors to solve social problems that threatened their survival and their ability to 
produce descendants” (p. 11). Specifically, he argues that revenge has been an effective 
mechanism through which to solve adaptive problems. For instance, revenge could solve 
social problems by deterring an aggressor from harming the individual a second time. 
Diamond (1977) provides evidence for this, showing that fear of retaliation deters 
aggression among men. Revenge can also deter other potential aggressors by signaling 
that one will not passively endure harm (Brown, 1968; Kim, Smith, & Brigham, 1998). 
Moreover, in the presence of a third party, revenge from a low power individual to a high 
power individual is more severe than downward revenge (Kim et al., 1998); this provides 
additional evidence that revenge is a means of not only showing transgressors, but also
showing others who have not committed a transgression, that one will not accept harm 
‘lying down.’ Revenge has further value in coercing people to cooperate who otherwise 
would be social loafers (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002). Since 
revenge has been used as an effective strategy throughout time and is beneficial in a 
variety of situations, it is likely that this reaction to a transgression will be a particularly 
salient option when an individual is the victim of a transgression. 
Because choosing to act in any specific way after a perceived transgression is a 
judgment, the process of judgment formation is important in understanding why revenge 
is chosen over other options. A type of motivated cognition that should influence how 
one makes judgments and that affects how one reacts to the saliency of information, 





I argue that due to its evolutionary benefits, revenge is the most accessible 
reaction after a transgression and should therefore be the most salient option for 
everyone. However, revenge is not taken after every transgression (McCullough, 
Kurzban & Tabak, 2010). Thus, the fact that revenge is the most salient option does not 
necessarily lead to engagement in revenge. To predict when revenge is taken, however, 
the NFC offers a unique explanation because it is characterized by seizing and freezing 
on the most salient option. 
Revenge and the Need for Cognitive Closure 
The NFC is a motivation regarding knowledge and judgment formation; 
specifically, it is a general proclivity to seek closure via any answer or judgment that 
achieves closure (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996).  For a person high in the NFC, any answer is seen as preferable to 
experiencing ambiguity or uncertainty. The NFC is comprised of preferences for order 
and structure, general closed-mindedness, decisiveness, a desire for predictability, and an 
intolerance of ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Further, the NFC is 
characterized by “seizing” and “freezing” tendencies such that an individual high (vs. 
low) in the NFC seizes on the most salient option in order to achieve closure quickly and 
freezes on that decision in order to avoid potential future losses of closure. 
Individuals high in the NFC should be more likely to seek revenge than 
forgiveness because they are likely to choose the option that is most salient. Choosing the 
most accessible alternative allows one to satisfy the need of urgency, which leads to 
achieving closure more quickly than if one were to assess different options (Kruglanski & 





specifically to prevent future losses of closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) because it 
deters future transgressions (Allred, 1999; Crombag et al., 2003).  
In summary, due to the evolutionary benefits of revenge, I expect revenge to be 
the most salient option in response to a transgression. Further, I expect individuals high 
(vs. low) in the NFC to choose revenge after being wronged because they will seize and 
freeze on revenge as the most accessible course of action, and thus will be more likely to 
desire and pursue it. 
Overview of Present Research 
The aim of this research is to demonstrate a positive relationship between the 
NFC and revenge such that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC desire and engage in 
revenge. I examine this relationship by looking at both the desire for reveng  and actual 
engagement in revenge as dependent measures. Further, I examine whether the saliency 
of revenge can be overridden with the priming of other responses to a transgression, such 
as forgiveness.  
I also manipulate the severity of the transgression. Individuals high (vs. low) in 
the NFC should satisfy their urgency and permanency desires for closure by seizing and 
freezing on the most salient option (which could be revenge or forgiveness in the priming 
manipulation); however, this may vary as a function of transgression severity. For low 
severity transgressions, the offense may be mild enough that any response may provide 
closure. More severe transgressions are greater losses of personal significance, however, 
and consequently have more enduring consequences (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 
2003). Therefore, forgiveness may not provide closure as easily after a severe 





achieve closure quickly and thus will respond with the fastest or easiest way to achieve 
closure, which should be revenge after a severe transgression.  
In the four studies presented herein, I test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: I expect a positive relationship between the NFC and one’s chronic, cross-
situational desire for revenge.  This question is investigated in Study 1a. 
Hypothesis 1b: I expect there to be a positive relationship between the NFC and situation-
specific desire for revenge. This hypothesis is addressed in Study 1b and exte s Study 
1a by examining how the NFC influences one’s reaction after a hypothetical 
transgression. 
Hypothesis 2:  I expect that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC will be more likely to 
seek revenge when they are the victim of a transgression (vs. engaging in a eutral 
interaction). This hypothesis is explored in Study 2 and investigates the relationship 
between NFC and revenge using more ecologically-valid measures.  In this study, I 
manipulated participants’ NFC and provided an opportunity to revenge (versus simply
state their desire for revenge) against the transgressor. 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC are more likely to seize and freeze on 
the most salient means to reaching closure (i.e. revenge or forgiveness).  Therefore, when 
revenge is made salient via priming, individuals high in the NFC will state a grater 
desire for revenge than forgiveness; likewise, when primed with forgiveness, high NFC 
individuals will state a greater desire for forgiveness than revenge.  
Hypothesis 4: For individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC, the severity of the transgression 
will moderate the effect of means (revenge or forgiveness) salience on which means is 





participants high (vs. low) in the NFC will state their desire for whatever means is primed 
(revenge or forgiveness). However, in response to a high (vs. low) severity transgression, 
participants high (vs. low) in the NFC will exhibit a greater desire for revenge regardless 
of means primed. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are addressed in Study 3, which measures the NFC 
and employs hypothetical transgressions of varying severities, as well as a priming 







































Chapter 2: Study 1a 
 
 
The purpose of Study 1a was to examine the relationship between the NFC and 
the desire for revenge after transgressions in general. Given the evidence provid d 
showing that revenge serves many adaptive purposes, I expected it to be the most 
cognitively accessible response option after a transgression occurs. Because of the 
characteristic attributes of people high (vs. low) in the NFC to seize on the first available 
or most salient option and then stick to that decision in order to achieve quick and lasting 
closure, I expected people high (vs. low) in the NFC to seize and freeze on revenge and 
therefore state a greater desire for revenge (Hypothesis 1a). 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 32 undergraduate psychology students (8 men and 24 women) 
from a large university with a mean age of 19.97 years old who participated in exchange 
for course credit. 
Procedure and Design. 
 Participants were told that the researcher was looking into the effect of individual 
differences on thoughts and behavior. Participants completed demographic information 
and the NFC scale (NFCS) full version (Kruglanski & Webster, 1994; see Appendix A). 
They then completed the Vengeance Scale (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992; see Appendix 
B), which is a short questionnaire measuring participants’ reaction to injustices across 
situations (i.e., how they chronically respond to transgressions).  Sample items include “I 





can’t live with myself unless I get revenge.” After completing the qustionnaires, 
participants were thoroughly debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
In support of Hypothesis 1a, the results show that there is a significant positive 
correlation between the NFC and desire for revenge across situations (r = .427, p < .02); 
the higher one’s NFC, the higher one’s desire for revenge across situations. While this 
study shows a positive relationship between the NFC and desire for revenge in general, it 
is important to show that this relationship holds after a transgression is experienced. In 
the present study, participants may have imagined prior transgressions against them and 
responded based on past experience. Therefore, it is possible that individuals high (vs. 
low) in the NFC simply have a general desire for revenge, even in the absence of a 
transgression, rather than a greater propensity to seize and freeze on revenge as the most 
accessible option following a specific transgression. Study 1b was designed to address 















Chapter 3: Study 1b 
 
The aim of study 1b was to conceptually replicate and extend the results of Study 
1a by providing a specific transgression followed by a measure of one’s desire for 
revenge, rather than measuring a general propensity to respond to transgressions with 
revenge. Additionally, this study measures desires for other reactions to a transgression 
such as forgiveness and avoidance as compared to a measure of vengeance alone. This 
provides a means to explore if individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC choose any available 
response that may provide closure after a transgression or if they desire revenge in 
particular. Specifically, I expected that after a transgression occurs, individuals high (vs. 
low) in the NFC will satisfy the urgency and permanency desires for closure through 
revenge only because it is the most salient option.   
Method 
Participants and Design. 
Thirty-eight undergraduate Psychology students (3 men and 35 women) with a 
mean age of 19.38 years old participated in exchange for course credit.  
Procedure. 
 Participants were told that the researcher was interested in looking into the effect 
of individual differences on judgments and behavior. Participants completed the NFCS 
short version (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; see Appendix C). Participants then read a
vignette describing a situation in which they are wronged by a friend.  Specifically, the 
friend leaves the participant at a party so that the participant must walk back to the dorms 
alone, even though they had previously discussed that they would walk back together (see 





Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory, 18-item version (TRIM-18, McCullough, 
Root, & Cohen, 2006; see Appendix E), which measures hypothetical reactions to the 
perpetrator of an injustice. Items include revenge-related actions such as “I’ll make 
him/her pay” and “I’m going to get even,” as well as benevolence and avoidance items 
such as “Despite what he/she did, I want us to have a positive relationship again” and “I 
cut off the relationship with him/her,” respectively. This was followed by a demographic 
questionnaire. After completing the survey, participants were thoroughly debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
In support of Hypothesis 1b, the results show that there is a significant positive 
correlation between the NFC and desire for revenge (r = .483, p < .01) such that as one’s 
NFC increases, there is also an increase in one’s desire for revenge after a transgression. 
Additionally, the correlations between the NFC and benevolence and the NFC and 
avoidance were not significant (ps > .34). This suggests that revenge is an especially 
salient response after a transgression and that individuals are seizing and freezing on 
revenge in particular and not on any possible reaction. 
Study 1b conceptually replicates the results of Study 1a and therefore, I have 
converging evidence with multiple methodologies that the NFC is significantly positively 
related to revenge. However, both of these studies were correlational. They demonstrate 
that a relationship exists between the NFC and revenge but do not provide support for the 
directionality of the relationship (e.g. that the more one wants to get revenge, the higher 
one’s NFC becomes) nor do they preclude the possibility of an extraneous third variable 





A second limitation of both Studies 1a and 1b is that they use low-impact 
hypothetical transgressions; therefore, the participant’s self-reported desire for revenge 
may not reflect what he/she would do if the situation actually presented itself. 
Additionally, the present study is limited in that it only examined the extent to which one 
desires revenge as an abstract concept and does not allow for the measurement of 
different behaviors as method of getting revenge. This may be an issue because different 
actions may be undertaken by different people as the way to get the same “revenge.” 
A further limitation in this study is that it only measured revenge after on 
situation and thus it is important to test alternative transgressions to show 
generalizeability across situations (this is addressed in Study 3). Finally, this study did 
not include a control condition. Therefore, it is possible that individuals high (vs. low) in 
the NFC simply have a general desire for revenge, even in the absence of a transgression, 
rather than a greater tendency to seize and freeze on revenge as the most accessible 



















Chapter 4: Study 2 
 
 
 The aim of Study 2 is to conceptually replicate and extend the results of Studies 
1a and 1b by manipulating the NFC and using a behavioral measure of revenge (versus 
self-report). I expected to find the same relationship between the NFC and revenge as 
was found in Studies 1a and 1b. With the experimental manipulation of the NFC, a causal 
relationship could be inferred such that a high NFC leads to a greater enactment of 
revenge. Manipulated high NFC (versus high need to avoid closure, hereafter described 
as a low NFC) should exemplify the characteristic seizing and freezing on the particularly 
accessible option of revenge after a transgression occurs. Therefore, I exp cted 
participants in the high (vs. low) NFC to engage in revenge. 
Method 
Participants. 
Eighty-four undergraduate psychology students from a large university 
participated in the current study. However, 8 students’ data were eliminated due to 
suspicion. Consequently, 76 students (39 men and 37 women) with a mean age of 20.1 
participated in exchange for course credit. Participants’ gender showed no significant 
effects on the dependent variable and for this reason will not be discussed. 
Procedure and Design. 
Participants were told that the researcher was interested in looking into the effect 
of individual differences on thoughts and behavior and that the study involved two 
participants who would work together in a role-playing exercise. In actuality, there was 





The study used a 2 (NFC: high and low) x 2 (Transgression: negative and neutral 
feedback) design. Participants’ NFC was manipulated through a recall task such that 
items from the NFCS (Kruglanski & Webster, 1994) were transformed into questions; 
this is in line with previous manipulations (Orehek, 2009). Participants were asked to 
recall three instances in which they behaved in line with a high (or low) NFC. For 
instance, participants in the high NFC were asked to “Think back to the times when you 
believed that orderliness and organization were among the most important characteristics 
of a good student” and participants in the low NFC manipulation condition were asked to 
“Think back to the times when even after you made up your mind about something, you 
were eager to consider a different opinion.” Participants were also given filler task 
questionnaires which were described as personality measures. 
The role-playing exercise acted both as a means to experimentally manipulate the 
presence (vs. absence) of a transgression and an opportunity for revenge. Participants 
were told that they and another participant were co-owners of a leasing company looking 
to purchase an apartment building and to choose a pool company that will build a pool at 
the apartment building site which they purchase. Participants were told that they were 
best suited to complete the task of choosing an apartment building to purchase based on 
the (bogus) personality measures. The task was intentionally difficult and ambiguous; it 
included twelve apartments to choose from, eleven criteria on which to base the decision, 
and no objective ‘right answer’ (see Appendix F). The uncertainty of this task w s 
important in that it allowed participants to distort information in line with their 
motivations (Kunda, 1990). I expected most, if not all, participants to (be motivated to) 





Participants then chose an apartment building and waited for feedback from their 
partners. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two feedback conditions: one i  
which the participant received negative feedback from his/her partner about the choice of 
apartment building (transgression manipulation) and the other in which the participant 
received neutral feedback (to serve as a control). Feedback was given in th  form of 
survey ratings of the partner’s decision and ability to do his/her job (see Appendix G). 
After the feedback was given, the participant waited for a few minutes while he/she 
believed that the other participant was deciding on his/her choice of pool company. The 
participant then saw the pool company that they believed their partner chose.T e pool 
company task was much easier, including only five choices and four criteria to use 
(Appendix H). There were clear ‘good choices’ and the partner was preprogrammed to 
always choose a good pool company.  
As a measure of revenge, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they 
agreed with their partner’s decision of pool company and their partner’s ability to do 
his/her job (using the same scale as their partner’s feedback). After completing the scale, 
the participants were thoroughly debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
I conducted a 2 (NFC: high and low) x 2 (Transgression: present and absent) 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to test the hypotheses.  There were no significant main 
effects of NFC, (F<1) or transgression manipulation, (F<1). In addition, the interaction 
between the NFC and transgression (operationalized as partner feedback) did not produce 





negative feedback, individuals high in the NFC did not differ in the ratings of their 
partner (M = 3.694, SE = .222) than low NFC individuals (M = 3.635, SE = .192). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2, which states that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC 
are more likely to seek revenge when they are the victim of a transgression (versus a 
neutral interaction), is not supported. It could be that participants who were transgressed 
against may have desired to engage in any type of other-directed aggression instead of 
revenge, which is specific to the person who perpetrated the transgression (Bar-Elli & 
Heyd, 1986). The procedures included an opportunity for participants to rate a third party, 
the experimenter, as an opportunity for general aggression. The directions stated that he 
researcher was interested in how well the experimenter was performing his/her duties and 
asked participants to be as open and honest as possible with their comments. This one-
item measure of aggression was counterbalanced with the dependent measure (i.e. the 
rating measure of the partner) and was an opportunity for aggression because participants 
could have provided negative feedback about the experimenter regardless of how well 
he/she was doing. To test whether participants would be satisfied with aggression toward 
anyone (vs. revenge toward the perpetrator), I examined the extent to which partiipants 
rated the experimenter negatively. None of the participants provided negative feedback 
about the experimenter and therefore I can state that participants were not m rely 
interested in aggression toward any person. 
There are several potential explanations for the lack of findings in Study 2. A 
possible explanation is that the manipulation may not have had a high enough impact 
(e.g. participants may have felt that the task was inconsequential and therefore their 





were insignificant). I did not include a manipulation check to ensure that participan s felt 
that they were wronged in some way (i.e. to test if participants thought that a 
transgression had occurred); without a transgression, one should not have a need for 
revenge. Indeed, the lack of a main effect of transgression suggests that participants did 
not feel as though they had been the victim of an injustice. 
Another limitation of the study is that participants’ perceptions of what constitutes 
revenge were not measured. Although participants were given the opportunity to rate
their partner (negatively or otherwise), this may not have constituted a method for 
revenge for some participants.  
It is also possible that because the partner’s performance was not ambiguous (in 
fact it was an unambiguously good choice), it may not have provided a desirable way to 
achieve revenge. Ambiguous situations allow for individuals to more easily distort 
information in line with their motivations (Kunda, 1990), and therefore the performance 
of the partner should have been made ambiguous. In less ambiguous situations, as in the 
current study, individuals are still able to enact revenge but may be less willing to behave 
in an overtly negative way or in any way that may cause them to be perceived n gatively. 
Therefore, it is possible that in the current study, participants desired revenge but felt that 
there was not a good opportunity provided to engage in it. Additionally, participants may 
have had a strong accuracy motivation in their decisions (Kruglanski, 1989) which may 
have affected the results. To the extent that the revenge motivation was aroused in the 
present study, the motivation for accuracy may have been more powerful and thus the 
participants may have experienced “focal override:” their focal motivation (i.e. accuracy) 





Chapter 5: Study 3 
 
 
 Study 3, carried out concurrently with Study 2, was designed to examine factors 
that may influence which response to a transgression is chosen. The factors include
dispositional NFC, which was shown in Studies 1a and 1b to affect one’s desire for 
revenge. However, whether or not one’s NFC affects desire for forgiveness, if it were 
made salient, has not been tested. High (vs. low) NFC individuals should satisfy their 
urgency and permanency desires for closure through any means of closure provided. 
After a transgression (i.e. a lack of closure), revenge and forgiveness are means to the 
goal of achieving closure. Therefore, if forgiveness was made momentarily salient, it 
should be desired more than revenge for individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC. 
Specifically, the current study explored whether priming an alternative means for closure 
(i.e. forgiveness) can override the natural accessibility of revenge such that individuals 
high (vs. low) in the NFC will seize and freeze on forgiveness (vs. revenge).  
Additionally, differing severities of transgressions were presented. Includi g 
transgressions of assorted severities was meant to examine if different amounts of 
wrongdoing would result in varying levels of desire for revenge or forgiveness. 
Specifically, for low severity transgressions, the wrongdoing may be mild enough that 
any response option may provide closure. A low severity transgression represents a mall 
loss of significance and therefore the motivation to achieve closure quickly should be 
achieved with whichever means is primed (revenge or forgiveness).  
For a more severe transgression, however, forgiveness may not provide closure as 
easily as for the mild transgression because a severe transgression l ads to a greater loss 





most easily served by revenge; achieving closure through forgiveness for a evere
transgression should be a much more complicated process because it takes additional 
time and affective-cognitive resources. Specifically, forgiveness requires cognitive effort 
in the counteraction of revenge and avoidance motivations (McCullough et al., 2001; 
McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). It also requires 
forbearance, the restraint from these motives along with the maintenance of forgiveness 
motivations; this is more difficult after a severe transgression (McCullough et al., 2003). 
Further, while benevolence motivations do not increase over time per se (Fehr, Gelfand, 
& Nag, 2010), avoidance and revenge motives progressively decline after a transgression 
(McCullough, et al., 2003) which may indicate that the relative extent to which one 
desires forgiveness versus revenge and avoidance becomes greater over time. Therefore, 
after a severe transgression, closure would be achieved more slowly using forgiveness as 
a means. 
This study tested Hypotheses 3 and 4. Specifically, I expected that individuals 
high (vs. low) in the NFC would be more likely to seize and freeze on whichever means 
to reaching closure (i.e. revenge or forgiveness) is made salient.  Therefore, when primed 
with revenge, individuals high in the NFC would state a greater desire for reveng  than 
forgiveness; likewise, when primed with forgiveness, high NFC individuals would state a 
greater desire for forgiveness than revenge (Hypothesis 3).  
I also expected that for individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC, the severity of the 
transgression would moderate the effect of means salience on which means is desired. 
Specifically, in response to a low (vs. high) severity transgression, particints high (vs. 





forgiveness). However, in response to a high (vs. low) severity transgression, participants 
high (vs. low) in the NFC would exhibit a greater desire for revenge regardless of means 
primed (Hypothesis 4).  
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 188 (46 men and 142 women) undergraduate psychology 
students from a large university who participated in exchange for course credit. Sixty-
four participants were excluded for the following reasons: scoring above the accepted 
score for the built-in social desirability measure in the NFC Scale (31 participants) or not 
following the directions of the study correctly (33 participants). Given that this was an 
online study, it was important to eliminate participants who did not follow instructions o 
ensure that the manipulations were effective. Consequently, 124 participants (33 males 
and 91 females) with a mean age of 20.37 participated. Participants’ gender showed no 
significant effects on the dependent variables and hence will not be discussed. 
Procedure and Design. 
 This study used a 2 (prime: revenge and forgiveness) x 2 (severity of 
transgression: high and low) x 2 (NFC: high and low) design. Participants completed a 
battery of questionnaires including the NFCS full version (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) 
and filler scales. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two prime conditions 
(revenge or forgiveness) in which they were primed with revenge or forgiveness through 
a lexical decision task. In this task, participants were told that they would be shown 
several strings of letters on the same screen and would have to determine if they are 





included “bilgram,” “vinoffy,” and “shouph.” The strings of letters in both conditions 
were of similar length to each other as well as to the nonwords. Revenge primes included 
“payback,” “penalty,” and “justice;” forgiveness primes included “pardon,” “excuse,” 
and “forget.” Participants saw 10 prime words, 15 nonwords, and 15 neutral words.  
After they completed the priming task, participants read one of two vignettes 
describing either a mild or a severe transgression (see Appendices I and J). Pilot testing 
showed that the transgression severity manipulation was effective (t(1) = -2.933, p < .01).  
The severe transgression vignette was rated as more severe (M = 6.50, SE = .52) than the 
mild transgression vignette (M = 5.66, SE = .70) on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all 
severe) to 7 (very severe). Following the vignette, participants were asked to rate their 
revenge and forgiveness intentions with the TRIM-18 (McCullough et al., 2006). After 
completing the TRIM-18 and demographic information, the participants were thorougly 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
The data were analyzed using a 2 (NFC: dichotomized high vs. low) x 2 (Prime: 
revenge vs. forgiveness) x 2 (Transgression Severity: high vs. low) x 2 (Means: r venge 
vs. forgiveness) mixed ANOVA with NFC, Prime, and Transgression Severity as 
between-subjects factors and Means as a within-subjects factor. This allow  for the 
comparison between one’s desire for revenge and desire for forgiveness. The NFC was 
measured continuously but was dichotomized based on a meaningful cutoff score2 
(Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005). The averaged NFC scores were 
divided at the value of 3.5, which is the center of the scale. Therefore, individuals who 
                                                
2 Although it is generally not recommended to dichotomize continuous variables (Preacher et al., 2005), the 
NFC was dichotomized for interpretability purposes. Analysis of the data using the NFC as a continuous 





reported an average NFC score of 3.5 or greater were categorized as high NFC and 
individuals who reported an average score of less than 3.5 were categorized as low NFC.  
To test Hypothesis 3, which states that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC are 
more likely to seize and freeze on whichever means to reaching closure (i.e. venge or 
forgiveness) is made salient, I examined the three-way interaction between he NFC, 
Prime, and desires for revenge vs. forgiveness. Specifically, I expected tha  when 
individuals high in the NFC are primed with revenge, they will state a greater desire for 
revenge than forgiveness and when they are primed with forgiveness, they will state a 
greater desire for forgiveness than revenge. The repeated measures ANOVA did not yield 
a significant three-way interaction (F < 1). Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
To test Hypothesis 4, which states that the severity of the transgression will 
moderate the effect of means salience on the desire of means for those high (vs. low) in 
the NFC, I examined the four-way interaction between NFC, Prime, Severity, and desires 
for revenge and forgiveness. I expected that in response to a low (vs. high) severity 
transgression, participants high (vs. low) in the NFC would state their desire for whatever 
means is primed (revenge or forgiveness) and that in response to a high (vs. low) severity
transgression, participants high (vs. low) in the NFC will state a greater desire for 
revenge regardless of means primed. The repeated measures ANOVA did not yield a 
significant interaction (F<1). Further, the pairwise comparison of the specific a priori 
hypothesis examining the difference between desires for revenge and forgiveness for 
individuals high in the NFC when primed with forgiveness and faced with a severe 
transgression was also not significant (F(1,115) = 1.067, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is 





Although the hypotheses were not supported, there was a significant interaction of 
interest. The repeated measures ANOVA yielded a significant two-way interaction 
between Severity and the desires for revenge vs. forgiveness (F(1,115) = 5.952, p < .02). 
Specifically, the pairwise comparison of desire for revenge as a function of severity is 
significant (F(1,115) = 5.075, p < .03), such that participants stated a greater desire for 
revenge when faced with a high severity transgression (M = 2.716, SE = .116) than a low 
severity transgression (M = 2.347, SE = .116). Further, participants stated a marginally 
greater desire for forgiveness (F(1,115) = 2.769, p = .099) when presented with a low 
severity transgression (M = 2.858, SE = .104) than a high severity transgression (M = 
2.613, SE = .104). 
The variables of interest in this study, namely the NFC and desire for revenge, 
also allow for an additional test of Hypothesis 1b, which states that the NFC will be
positively related to desire for revenge after a transgression. A one-way ANOVA yielded 
a marginally significant main effect of the NFC on the desire for revenge (F(1, 122) = 
2.866, p = .093), such that high NFC individuals reported a greater desire for revenge (M 
= 2.688, SE = .087) than low NFC individuals (M = 2.411, SE = .138). Therefore, Study 3 
provides converging support for the basic effect found in Studies 1a and 1b: that a high 
NFC is related to one’s desire for getting vengeance. 
Discussion 
The results of study 3 were unable to provide support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
However, importantly, Study 3 yielded converging evidence for the NFC-revenge 
relationship found in Studies 1a and 1b; this underscores that the relationship of interest 





interaction between severity of transgression and desire for revenge such that individuals 
stated a greater desire for revenge when presented with a severe (vs. mild) transgression. 
This supplies a manipulation check of the severity condition and provides support that the 
manipulation of the severity of transgression was successful. 
The lack of support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 could be due to the possibility that the 
priming manipulation was ineffective. The prime words were not pretested to ensure their 
efficacy in increasing the salience of the constructs. Further, a direct manipulation check 
of saliency, such as a reaction time measure to compare how quickly participants respond 
to salient versus not-salient items, was not included in the study design. The results show 
that the primes were not able to produce a greater desire for the primed (vs. not) means of 
closure, which suggests that perhaps the primed constructs were not made any more 
salient. If this were the case, individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC would have had a
greater saliency of revenge in both prime conditions, as suggested by the findings of 
Studies 1a and 1b. However, individuals high in the NFC did not state a greater desire for 
revenge than individuals low in the NFC when primed with revenge (F<1). Conversely, 
when primed with forgiveness, individuals high in the NFC stated a marginally greater 
desire for revenge (M = 2.685, SE = .126) than individuals low in the NFC (M = 2.200, 
SE = .212; F(1,115) = 3.869, p = .052).  
This may be explained through the possible tension resulting from the (opposing) 
saliency of both revenge and forgiveness constructs. Specifically, high (vs. low) NFC 
individuals may experience discomfort with the competing saliency of reveng and 
forgiveness. The theory presented herein assumes that whereas revengeis always salient 





Therefore, in the forgiveness prime condition, I assume that the construct of forgiveness 
was made more salient than it is normally. This means that both revenge and forgiveness 
would have been salient, the former due to evolutionary adaptability, and the latter due to 
priming. This “double-saliency” could create cognitive tension for participants, especially 
for those high in the NFC. Indeed, Webster and Kruglanski (1994) state those high (vs. 
low) in NFC will experience “affective discomfort” (p. 1050) when faced with ambiguity. 
People high in the NFC also prefer decisiveness (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) which is 
afforded by seizing on the most salient means to a goal; however, if two constructs are 
equally salient, high NFC individuals would have a more difficult time seizing and 
freezing on either one. This may have prompted them to manage their cognitive tes on
by choosing revenge to an even greater extent, because of several possible reasons 
including its permanent saliency, its potential greater automaticity, and/or high (vs. low) 
NFC participants’ greater experience with revenge following transgressions. 
Limitations. 
There are several limitations to the present study. This study did not allow the 
baseline desires of revenge and forgiveness as a function of the NFC to be measured. 
This is important to explore because it could eliminate the hypothesis that high (vs. low) 
NFC individuals desire revenge more in general due to reasons other than the saliency of 
revenge (e.g. due to greater dispositional aggression). The expected results would show 
that individuals high and low in the NFC should equally desire revenge (as well as 
forgiveness).  
A further possible limitation concerns the severity of the transgressions. Although 





pilot study), it is possible that both were severe enough to have crossed some threshold 
that may exist whereby revenge is the only means to achieve the goal of closure. Indeed, 
there appears to have been a slight ceiling effect since the average betwe n-subjects 
ratings of severity for both low and high severity transgression in the pretest wer  5.66 
and 6.5 respectively on a 7-point Likert scale. Thus, both transgressions were viewed as 
severe and consequently, one may conclude that the manipulation of severity was not 
strong enough (i.e. the difference between the conditions was small). Although the study 
provided evidence that the desires for revenge and forgiveness varied as a function of 
transgression severity, the differences between severity conditions for desire of 
forgiveness were only marginally significant. Therefore, the results do not necessarily 
preclude the possibility that both transgressions met a level of severity that was not able 
to be forgiven. It would be important for future researchers to examine transgressions that 
are mild enough that forgiveness and revenge are seen as equally instrumental to 
achieving closure. Additionally, as stated above, a limitation of Study 3 was the 
inefficacy of the priming manipulation and thus subsequent research should pilot test, and 
provide a manipulation check for, prime words to ensure their efficacy. 
Furthermore, the current study was an online study that used vignettes which can 
be argued to lack some ecological validity, on both counts. Therefore, the priming of 
revenge and forgiveness may not have been successful because participants were not 
giving the task their full attention. Furthermore, the vignettes may not have pro ided a 
high enough impact manipulation in order to get participants’ true revenge tendencies, 
although the support for the NFC-revenge relationship via Studies 1a, 1b, and the current 





Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
 
 Together, these studies provide convergent evidence for the relationship between 
the NFC and desire for revenge after experiencing a transgression. Study 1a found a 
positive relationship between the NFC and one’s desire for revenge in general and 
Study1b found a similar relationship between the NFC and one’s desire for revenge after 
a specific transgression. In addition, Study 3 provided additional evidence for Hyp thesis 
1b: that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC will seize and freeze on revenge after a 
transgression. The results of these studies can be combined so one may conduct a (very) 
small meta-analytic investigation (Rosenthal, 1991; Whitlock, 2005) to explore the 
average effect size of the relationship between the NFC and revenge. A composite p-
value of the three studies, weighted for sample size, yields (Fisher) = .0004; additionally, a 
composite effect size of R2 yields  = .129 and weighted  = .108, (95% CI [.085, 
.535]). Therefore, on the basis of these results, I conclude that the relationship between 
the NFC and a desire for revenge is robust and merits further investigation. 
However, Study 2 was not able to provide support for this relationship using a 
behavioral (vs. self-report) measure. Further, Study 3 did not provide support for 
Hypothesis 3: individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC did not exhibit a greater desire for 
whichever means was primed. Study 3 also did not provide evidence supporting 
Hypothesis 4 in that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC, when primed with forgiveness 
but faced with a severe transgression, did not report a greater desire for revenge (vs. 
forgiveness). 
Study 3 specifically tested that the NFC is positively associated with revenge due 





unable to provide support for the expected NFC by Prime relationship and specifically 
did not show that the priming manipulation was effective. The ineffective manipulation 
of means salience could be due to logistical concerns (i.e. the manipulation was a short 
task involving primes in an online study). Alternatively, the inefficacy of the priming 
manipulation may suggest that it is not possible to override the natural saliency of 
revenge. In other words, revenge (vs. forgiveness) as an initial, although perhaps only 
imagined, reaction to a transgression (McCullough et al., 2003) may be so ingrained in 
the human brain that temporary increases in the salience of other reactions are not st ong 
enough to compete.  
Another possibility for the lack of support of the interaction between NFC and 
means prime is that revenge is salient because it is instrumental to the urgency and 
permanency desires of closure. Revenge satisfies the urgency of achieving closure after a 
transgression by offering a means to the goal of closure that is easily (and imme iately 
able to be) performed. Revenge also acts to gain permanent closure and prevents futur  
losses of closure because it deters future transgressions (Allred, 1999; Crombag et al., 
2003). On the other hand, forgiveness takes longer to enact (McCullough et al., 2003) and 
thus does not serve to achieve closure promptly. Therefore, priming forgiveness without 
increasing its perceived instrumentality to urgency and permanency would not have 
increased the extent to which individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC would seize and 
freeze on forgiveness. 
A potential reason that differences in revenge and forgiveness tendencies as a 
function of the NFC may not have been found as expected in Study 3 is because one or 





(2010) propose that revenge and forgiveness evolved to serve different functions. 
Specifically, they suggest that revenge serves the goal of preventing subsequent harm 
while forgiveness evolved in order to preserve important relationships in the face of 
being harmed. Therefore, while preventing future harm may be related to one’s se se of 
worth and significance (i.e. standing up for oneself so as not to be taken advantage of in 
the future), preserving relationships may be unrelated to achieving closure by 
reestablishing one’s self-value. These potential alternative goals provide intr guing 
hypotheses for future research. 
Limitations.  
The present research has several general limitations. Firstly, the studi s have only 
shown that a high (vs. low) NFC is related to a greater desire for revenge and were unable 
to show that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC were more likely to enact reveng. 
Therefore, I cannot reject the possibility that the NFC is related only to a greater desire 
for revenge and not a greater tendency to engage in vengeful behavior. 
Similarly, the study in which the NFC was manipulated did not support the 
expected relationship between high (vs. low) NFC and a greater enactment of revenge. 
Therefore, this research does not provide support for the directionality of the relationship: 
that high (vs. low) NFC leads to a greater tendency to revenge. Additionally, it remains 
possible that individuals high in trait (i.e. measured) NFC have other commonalities that 
may cause a greater desire for revenge and thus that it is not the NFC, but some other 
psychological construct, that is driving the results. Future studies should examin  the 
NFC-revenge relationship while holding constant Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, 





possible correlates of the NFC that may be confounding the results. Additionally, future 
studies may wish to examine Trait Aggression (Buss & Perry, 1992) since it is poss ble 
that high NFC individuals may be higher in trait aggression and therefore it is aggression 
that is leading to a greater desire for revenge instead of the NFC’s seizing and freezing on 
revenge as the most salient option. 
Further, the potential moderators of the relationship between NFC and revenge 
are not clear. Although the results show that a severe (vs. mild) transgression may lead to 
a desire for revenge, the present research has not provided support showing that saliency 
of alternative means to achieve closure or transgression severity moderates the 
relationship.  
Through addressing these limitations in subsequent research, such as including an 
effective and strengthened priming manipulation (limitation of Study 3), including a 
higher impact manipulation of severity of transgression that produces larger differences 
between the transgression conditions (limitation of Study 3), and addressing the potential 
overriding accuracy motivation (limitation of Study 2), the phenomena and relationships 












Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
 This research will add to the social psychology literature in several ways. First, 
Studies 1a, 1b, and 3 found converging support for the relationship between the NFC and 
revenge. Thus, there is a clear trend, evident from the individual studies as well th  
composite results, which supports that a high (vs. low) NFC is positively related to one’s 
desire for revenge.  
This research also contributes to the existing literature by looking at a different 
type of individual difference characteristic influencing revenge than tose that have 
previously been examined. For instance, revenge has been shown to be related to social 
dominance orientation (McKee & Feather, 2008) and belief in a just world (Kaiser, 2004) 
which can both be conceptualized as endorsement of specific belief systems. Namely, 
social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994) points to a belief that there is a natural 
social hierarchy while belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980) is a belief that the world is fair 
and just. However, the NFC is not a specific belief system but rather is a motivation that 
influences both knowledge acquisition and judgment, which can influence the formation 
and maintenance of beliefs.  
Furthermore, this research may promote greater understanding of a possible 
antecedent of terrorism. Juergensmeyer (2000) proposed the Humiliation-Revenge th ory 
of terrorism such that humiliation by an oppressor (e.g., a parent, a government) will lead 
to revenge as a response to the oppression. In his theory, terrorism is a method of 
revenge. Indeed, Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2006) find that revenge is a motivation 
underlying the joining of a terrorist organization. Therefore, it is possible that high (vs. 





more predisposed to endorse terrorism. This may have practical implications for policy 
makers who work toward counterterrorism goals. Specifically, a better undstanding of 































NFCS – full version 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you would agree with each 
according to your attitudes, beliefs, and experiences. Please respond according to the 
following scale.  














1. I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success.                        
2. Even after I’ve made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a d fferent 
opinion.                                                                                                             
3. I don’t like situations that are uncertain. 
4. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
5. I like to have friends who are unpredictable. 
6. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperature.  
7. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might happen.  
8. When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what to expect.  
9. I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my life.  
10. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.  
11. I hate to change my plans at the last minute.  
12. I would describe myself as indecisive. 
13. When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is that I want.  
14. When faced with a problem, I usually see the one best solution very quickly.  
15. When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset.  
16. I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment.  
17. I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.  
18. I have never been late for an appointment or work.  
19. I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment.  
20. My personal space is usually messy and disorganized.  
21. In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong.  
22. I have never known someone that I did not like.  





24. I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics of a 
good student.  
25. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be right.  
26. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.  
27. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them.  
28. I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and requirements.  
29. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different options on the issue as possible.  
30. I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.  
31. I like to know what people are thinking all the time.  
32. I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things.  
33. It’s annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind.  
34. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
35. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.  
36. I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own.  
37. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.  
38. I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or intention is unclear to me.  
39. I believe that one should never engage in leisure activities.  
40. When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it’s confu ing.  
41. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face.  
42. I’d rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.  
43. I feel that there is no such thing as an honest mistake.  
44. I do not usually consult many different options before forming my own view. 
45. I dislike unpredictable situations.  
46. I have never hurt another’s feelings.  






















Listed below are a number of statements that describe attitudes that different people have. 
There are no right or wrong answers, only opinions. Read each item and decide whether
you agree or disagree and to what extent. If you strong agree, choose 7; if you strongly 
disagree choose 1; if you feel somewhere in between circle any one of the numb rs 

















1. It’s not worth my time or effort to pay back someone who has wronged me. 
2. It is important for me to get back at people who have hurt me. 
3. I try to even the score with anyone who hurts me. 
4. It is always better not to seek vengeance. 
5. I live by the motto “Let bygones be bygones.” 
6. There is nothing wrong in getting back at someone who has hurt you. 
7. I don’t just get mad, I get even. 
8. I find it easy to forgive those who have hurt me. 
9. I am not a vengeful person. 
10. I believe in the motto “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” 
11. Revenge is morally wrong. 
12. If someone causes me trouble, I’ll find a way to make them regret it.  
13. People who insist on getting revenge are disgusting. 
14. If I am wronged, I can’t live with myself unless I get revenge. 
15. Honor requires that you get back at someone who has hurt you. 
16. It is usually better to show mercy than to take revenge. 
17. Anyone who provokes me deserves the punishment that I give them. 
18. It is always better to “turn the other cheek.” 
19. To have a desire for vengeance would make me feel ashamed. 








NFCS – short version 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you would agree with each 
according to your attitudes, beliefs, and experiences. Please respond according to the 
following scale.  














1. In case of uncertainty, I prefer to make an immediate decision, whatever it may be.                        
2. When I find myself facing various, potentially valid, alternatives, I decide in favor of 
one of them quickly and without hesitation. 
3.  I have never been late for work or for an appointment. 
4.  I prefer to decide on the first available solution rather than to ponder at length what 
decision I should make. 
5. I get very upset when things around me aren’t in their place. 
6. Generally, I avoid participating in discussions on ambiguous and controversial 
problems. 
7.  When I need to confront a problem, I do not think about it too much and I decide 
without hesitation. 
8.  When I need to solve a problem, I generally do not waste time in considering diverse 
points of view about it. 
9.  I prefer to be with people who have the same ideas and tastes as myself.  
10.  Generally, I do not search for alternative solutions to problems for which I already 
have a solution available. 
11. I feel uncomfortable when I do not manage to give a quick response to problems that 
I face. 
12.  I have never hurt another person’s feelings. 
13.  Any solution to a problem is better than remaining in a state of uncertainty.  
14. I prefer activities where it is always clear what is to be done and how it needs to be 
done.       
15.  After having found a solution to a problem I believe that it is a useless waste of time 
to take into account diverse possible solutions. 







Vignette for Study 1b 
 
“You and a friend have been close friends for quite some time. You frequently drive to 
school together, meet each other for meals, and hang out on the weekends. You also 
signed up for some of the same classes this semester and therefore occasionally do 
homework together. If you were to list your top three closest friends at school, t is person 
would definitely be on the list, if not in the top spot.  
 The two of you get word that a very big party is happening tonight and are very 
excited to go even though it is pretty far away. You are acquaintances with the host of te 
party, having only met them once briefly in the hallway; however, your friend knows 
them better. You and your friend have a strict ‘no ditching each other’ policy that ou 
guys are very good at following. When you get to the party, you see a mutual friend and 
while talking to them, your friend sees someone they want to talk to and goes over there. 
A few hours later you realize that you haven’t seen your friend in a while. You know they 
must still be at the party because you had already planned on going back to the dorms 
together.  
 You see your mutual friend again and ask if they have seen the friend you came 
with. They reply that your friend left about 45 minutes earlier with some people. You call 
your friend’s cell phone to find out if they are coming back but get their voicemail. You 













Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory—18-Item Version 
 
Think about the situation just described. Remember how you felt when the situation was 
occurring and how you reacted to the other person. Please rate the following items on a 5-
point scale.  
 
For the following questions, please indicate your current thoughts and feelings about the 
person who hurt you; that is, we want to know how you feel about that person right ow. 





2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly   
Agree 
 
1. I’ll make him/her pay.  
2. I am trying to keep as much distance between us as possible 
3. Even though his/her actions hurt me, I have goodwill for him/her. 
4. I wish that something bad would happen to him/her. 
5. I am living as if he/she doesn’t exist, isn’t around. 
6. I want us to bury the hatchet and move forward with our relationship. 
7. I don’t trust him/her. 
8. Despite what he/she did, I want us to have a positive relationship again. 
9. I want him/her to get what he/she deserves.  
10. I am finding it difficult to act warmly toward him/her. 
11. I am avoiding him/her. 
12. Although he/she hurt me, I am putting the hurts aside so we could resume our 
relationship. 
13. I’m going to get even. 
14. I forgive him/her for what he/she did to me. 
15. I cut off the relationship with him/her. 
16. I have released my anger so I can work on restoring our relationship to health. 
17. I want to see him/her hurt and miserable. 






Apartment List for Study 2 
 
Price Sq. Ft. # Bedrooms # Bathrooms Balcony Fitness Center Distance to City W/D Pets Allowed Walk-in Closets Extra Storage
Apt A $100,000 600 1 1 No No 1 hour √ √ No √
Apt B $190,000 1100 2 2 √ √ 10 minutes No No √ No
Apt C $120,000 700 1 1 No No 45 minutes √ √ No √
Apt D $160,000 900 2 1.5 √ √ 35 minutes No No No No
Apt E $145,000 1000 2 1 No No 50 minutes √ √ √ √
Apt F $170,000 1350 2 1.5 √ √ 20 minutes No No √ No
Apt G $110,000 700 1 1 No No 55 minutes √ √ No √
Apt H $200,000 800 2 2 √ √ in city √ No √ No
Apt I $165,000 1000 2 1.5 No √ 15 minutes No √ √ No
Apt J $135,000 850 1 1 No No 40 minutes √ No No √
Apt K $180,000 1400 2 2 √ √ 30 minutes √ √ √ No





Opinion Rating Scale for Apartment/Pool Role-Playing Task for Study 2 
 
Please rate the statements below on the following scale (1 – strongly disaree, 3 – 
neutral, 5 – strongly agree) 
- My partner has made a well thought-out decision. 
- I approve of my partner’s choice. 
- My partner did not take all criteria into account when making his/her decision. 
- I feel confident that my partner is qualified to do the job. 
- My partner did not make the same choice I would have. 
- My partner has chosen the best option on the list. 
- I think there are more appropriate alternatives on the list than the one my partner
chose. 
















Pool Company List for Study 2 
 
- Pool Company A 
 Price: $60,000 
 Size(s): 24 x 48ft rectangular pool 
 Reputation: Satisfactory 
 Time to Complete Pool Construction: 2 months 
 
- Pool Company B 
Price: $75,000 
 Size(s): 18 x 28ft rectangular pool, 15 x 26ft oval pool, and a hot tub 
 Reputation: Good 
 Time to Complete Pool Construction: 6 months 
 
- Pool Company C 
Price: $55,000 
 Size(s): 20 x 40ft rectangular pool 
 Reputation: Poor 
 Time to Complete Pool Construction: 1 month 
 
- Pool Company D 
 Price: $70,000 
 Size(s): 25 x 50ft rectangular pool and 10ft diameter circle pool for children 
 Reputation: Excellent 
 Time to Complete Pool Construction: 8 months 
 
- Pool Company E 
 Price: $65,000 
 Size(s): 20 x 40ft rectangular pool, 10 x 20ft oval pool and a pond 
 Reputation: New Company – no reviews 













Low Severity Vignette for Study 3 
“You and a classmate are working on a project together for a class. The projectis 
important to your grade and you’ve worked really hard on your part of it. After working 
separately on different parts of the project, you and your partner meet to finalize any 
loose ends. When you meet with your partner, you realize that his/her work is only 
partially done and the work that is complete isn’t very good. Your partner says that 
he/she decided to go to a party last night instead of working on the project. The project is 
due the next day and you and your partner work together on the rest of his/her part in 
order to make sure that it gets done before the deadline. 
The following day in class, when it’s your turn to present your project, your partner takes 
control of the presentation and does most of the talking. When the class asks questions 
about the topic, your partner answers the majority of them acting as if she did most of the 















High Severity Vignette for Study 3 
“You are a student at a large regional university. You enjoy classes and have a job at a 
local restaurant. Last week, you saw an information sheet posted on the bulletin board 
describing a scholarship, titled Scholarship A, for which you are eligible. Aft r reading 
the scholarship description, you decide you are very interested in it. It requires an essay 
and after working several hours on the application and essay, you submit your resume 
and essay for review.  
 While talking to a fellow student, you learn that he has applied for Scholarship B, 
a scholarship which includes slightly more money than Scholarship A. He explains th t 
he is not interested in Scholarship A and that he is very confident about getting 
Scholarship B. You mention during the conversation that you applied for Scholarship A, 
a point which surprises your acquaintance. He said he didn’t realize you were looking for 
scholarships and you explain that you have on-and-off and explain why you think you are 
qualified. In your excitement in thinking about the scholarship, you also tell him some of 
the main points of your essay. 
 When you have your phone interview for the scholarship, you feel that it goes 
well. You provide thoughtful answers to the questions and some creative ideas for how 
you can help advertise for the scholarship at your school next year. The interviewer is 
somewhat quiet during your answers and you attribute this to surprise at the creativity of 
them. At the end of the interview, the interviewer says that you’ll be hearing about their 





 A few days later, you get a call from the interviewer who says that they chose 
someone else for the scholarship. You are upset by this news and find out by a friend that 
the person chosen for the scholarship is the fellow student who had said he was applying 
only for Scholarship B. You find out that he had a phone interview for Scholarship A the 
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